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seen how far the rule against restraints on alienation erodes this
control.
CONCLUSION
As a result of American Industrial, a patentee may not by
agreement impose territorial restraints on his sublicensees' sales if
the sublicensee purchases the product from the manufacturing licen-
see. The district court correctly determined that section 261 did not
permit these restraints. In the process, however, the court overly
strained the meaning of section 261. Instead the court could have
construed section 261 as inapplicable to licensees of an exclusive
right.
The conjunction of the ancient rule against restraints on aliena-
tion and the exhaustion-by-sale doctrine gave rise to a limitation of
section 261. From a policy viewpoint, the court's strict construction
was favorable because the reward to the patentee was deemed too
speculative to permit the anticompetitive agreements.
In applying the per se rule, the district court was very much
influenced by Schwinn. However, a presumptive rule of invalidity
would have been preferable, to accommodate the meritorious excep-
tions of some new of failing patentee firms while still sounding a
general notice.
American Industrial still leaves many issues unresolved. As in
Schwinn, problems arise as to the scope of the term "sale." As a
result of these two cases, an agreement labelling the relationship an
agency will be judged on the facts to see if a sale is involved. But a
contract labelling a transaction as a sale will not be scrutinized to
see whether the more lenient reasonability test for an agency should
be applied. Furthermore, the court did not challenge the patentee's
territorial control over the licensee's sales, nor did the court dwell on
the patentee's degree of territorial control over his sublicensees
under a "valid" agency relationship.
MARC R.K. BUNGEROTH
Commercial Law—Confession of Judgment—Hearing Required on
Voluntariness of Waiver Before Entry of judgment—Virgin Islands
National Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc.'—Defendants, Tropical
Ventures, Inc. and World Resorts, Ltd., obtained a loan from
plaintiff, Virgin Islands National Bank. The loan was evidenced by
a demand note and secured by a mortgage on properties in St.
Croix. 2 As part of this transaction, defendants signed a power of
358 F. Supp. 1203 (D.V.I. 1973).
2 Id. at 1205.
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attorney authorizing a confession of judgment against them in event
of default. 3
 When the defendants defaulted on the loan the plaintiff
filed suit in federal district court to recover the balance under the
note and mortgage after realizing a portion of the debt from guaran-
tees by third parties. The defendants were served with process, and
after the time for filing an answer had passed, a local attorney
confessed judgment on their behalf. 4
 Plaintiffs subsequently re-
quested formal entry of judgment by the clerk of court, who referred
the question to the district judge. 5
 Because the nature of confession
judgments is at best only nominally adversary, the judge on his own
motion considered the question whether cognovit procedures violate
due process requirements, 6 and HELD: confession of judgment pro-
cedures are not per se constitutionally defective; however, the de-
fendant must be afforded a full preliminary evidentiary hearing on
the voluntariness of his waiver of notice before such judgment may
be entered against him.' The district court based its holding on the
reasonable implication from the Supreme Court's dicta in the cases
of D.H. Overmyer v. Frick Co. 8 and Fuentes v. Shevin, 9
 and on the
Court's holding in Swarb v. Lennox," which indicate that confes-
sion judgments signed by unsophisticated consumers in form con-
tracts are constitutionally suspect because the voluntariness of their
waiver of rights is doubtful." The Virgin Islands holding thus
reflects the growing disfavor which the use of confession judgments
has found in the courts, and represents an effort, not undertaken in
earlier cases, to develop a procedural safeguard to isolate those
3
 A confession judgment is a traditional device by which a debtor authorizes an entry of
judgment against himself if the obligation set forth in the instrument containing the clause is
not paid when due. D.H. Overmyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 176 (1972); Jones v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 930, 935 (W.D. Mich. 1968). The phrases power of
attorney, confession of judgment, cognovit note and cognovit clause are often used inter-
changeably to signify this process. Blott v. Blatt, 227 Iowa 1108, 1111, 290 N.W. 74, 76
(1940).
4
 358 F. Supp. at 1205. A confession judginent may be obtained from a designated
authority before an action has been brought, but the procedure must be authorized by statute.
At common law, and under federal statutes, a confession judgment may be obtained only after
the action has been brought. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; D.H. Overmyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S.
174, 175 (1972).
5
 Under most state statutes, the clerk is authorized to enter judgment. See, e.g., Penn-
sylvania Rules of Civil Procedure §§ 2950-76. Under Federal Rules, however, judgment may
be entered by a clerk only after a decision by the judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
e' 358 F. Supp. at 1206. Although the court's reasoning with respect to the cases under
Fed. R. Civ, P. 59, authorizing the consideration of due process questions on a judge's own
motion, may be correct, there exists a countervailing policy in the federal courts to decide only
those constitutional issues presented, and only in their narrowest possible scope. See United
States v, Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48 (1952). But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
454 (1971), quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885). See also text al notes
71-74 infra.
7
 358 F. Supp. at 1206.
1
 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972).
9
 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972).
I° 405 U,S. 191, reh. denied, 405 U.S. 1049 (1972).
" Sec 358 F. Supp. at 1206,
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instances in which due process requirements are violated by waiver
provisions of a credit agreement.
This note will examine the hearing procedure envisioned by the
Virgin Islands court in light of the Supreme Court's position on the
waiver of procedural rights. It is submitted that with the exception
of the placement of the burden of proof, the Virgin Islands proce-
dure is acceptable and consistent with the Supreme_ Court's pro-
cedural due process requirements, and is likely to be adopted by
courts facing similar challenges to confession judgments.
In its 1969 decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Co.,I 2 the
Supreme Court signaled a change in the judicial attitude toward
prejudgment remedies, holding that, absent notice and hearing prior
to the garnishment of wages, Wisconsin's garnishment procedures
violated fundamental principles of due process." Prior to Sniadach,
the Court had rejected constitutional attacks on prejudgment proce-
dures because the taking of property was seen as conditional, tem-
porary and part of an established legal proceeding,'" and temporary
deprivations were not considered to be deprivations protected by
due process. As the Sniadach Court noted," changes in the
economic system had made wages the most prevalent form of "prop-
erty," and their deprivation now resulted in much greater
hardship." The Court noted that changes in the definition of con-
stitutionally protected property should reflect the significance of its
deprivation, and concluded that "a procedure which would pass
muster under a feudal regime" does not necessarily give protection
to "all property in its modern forms." 17
Because Sniadach had described wages as "a specialized type
of property,"" some courts interpreted the new definition of con-
stitutionally protected property as limited to wages alone. 19 Others
viewed the holding as requiring notice and prior hearing.before the
12 395 U.S, 337 (1969).
13 Id. at 342.
'4 McKay v. McInnes, 127 Me. 110, 116, 141 A. 699, 702 (1928). See, e.g., Coffin Bros.
v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928); Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111-12 (1921). See
generally McDonnell, Sniadach, The Replevin Cases and Self-Help Repossession—Due Pro-
cess Tokenism?, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 437, 440 (1973); Recent Decisions, 35 Albany
L. Rev. 370, 373 (1971).
IS 395 U.S. at 340.
16 What we know from our study of this problem is that in a vast number of cases
the debt is a fraudulent one, saddled on a poor ignorant person who is trapped in an
easy credit nightmare, in which he is charged double for something he could not pay
for even if the proper price was called for, and then being hounded into giving up his
pound of flesh and being fired besides.
Id., citing 14 Cong. Rec. 1832 (1968).
12 395 U.S. at 340.
's Id.
19 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J&P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970); 300 W.
115th Realty Co. v. Department of Buildings, 26 N.Y.2d 538, 544, 260 N.E.2d 534, 537, 311
N.Y.S.2d 899 (1970).
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taking of any property. 2° In Fuentes v. Shevin, 21
 the Supreme
Court embraced the broader interpretation of its Sniadach decision,
extending due process requirements to the taking of any property
regardless of its importance or necessity. 22 The Court held that the
replevin statutes of Florida and Pehnsylvania worked a deprivation
of property without due process because the appellants had not been
provided a prior hearing on the validity of the creditor's claim. 23
The Court rejected the claim that appellants had waived their due
process rights by signing conditional sales contracts which provided
that the property could be repossessed on default. It noted that the
contractual provision adverted to by the creditor did not, on its face,
amount to a waiver. 24
 For that reason the Court did not comment
on the "involuntariness or unintelligence" of waiver, 25
 but added
that had a waiver been negotiated, the recognition that the parties
were far from equal in bargaining power, that the contract was a
printed form, and that no bargaining over contractual terms had
occurred, would call for closer judicial scrutiny of such a waiver. 26
Both statutes permitted an opportunity for a hearing after the dis-
puted property had already been seized, but the Court stressed that
the absence of judicial supervision "at a meaningful time" rendered
such procedures constitutionally deficient: 27
[A]s a matter of constitutional principle, it [a bond re-
quirement] is no replacement for the right to a prior
hearing that is . the only truly effective safeguard against
arbitrary deprivation of property. While the existence of
these other, less effective, safeguards may be among the
considerations that affect the form of hearing demanded by
due process, they are far from enough by themselves to
obviate the right to a prior hearing of some kind. 28
The nature and form of this prior hearing and the precise issues to
be resolved were left unspecified by the Court. It did require that
the hearing provide "a real test," but the potential variations of the
form of the hearing were left to legislative prerogative. 29
The burden of deprivation of property in its modern form,
through garnishment, replevin, confession judgments and other pre-
judgment procedures, is borne primarily by low income consumers
211 See, e.g., Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 718, 172 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1969).
21 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
22 Id. at 89-90. See also The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1972).
23
 407 U.S. at 96.
24
 Id. at 95.
" Id.
2° Id. at 94-96, citing D.H. Overmyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972). Sec text at
notes 31-34 infra.
27
 407 U.S. at 80-81.
Id. at 83.
29 Id. at 96-97.
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who must rely on the extension of credit and its attendant pro-
cedural strictures to make purchases. 3° However, the question of the
constitutionality of confession judgments has yet to reach the Su-
preme Court in circumstances involving low income consumers.
D.H. Overmyer v. Frick Co. 3 ' dealt with a default by a corporation
on a contract for equipment manufactured by another corporation.
The contract contained a cognovit clause allowing the entry of
judgment without notice or hearing in exchange for release of
mechanic's liens and reduction of interest rates. 32 The Court held
that cognovit provisions are not per se unconstitutional and that in
this case defendant, a commercial enterprise, had knowingly, intel-
ligently and voluntarily waived its due process rights in legitimate
bargaining with advice of counsel. 33
 However, the Court specifically
added the dictum that its holding was not controlling precedent for
the facts of other cases; therefore, where the contract is one of
adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, or
where the debtor receives no additional consideration for the cog-
novit provision, "other legal consequences may ensue." 34
Though the Court upheld the specific waiver in Overmyer, its
decision appears consistent with the due process requirements
defined in Sniadach and Fuentes. Sniadach and Fuentes embraced
the proposition that defaulting parties may not constitutionally be
deprived of property without a hearing on the merits of their con-
tractual dispute, and Fuentes implied that waiver of such a right
might be constitutionally suspect. 35
 Overmyer makes explicit the
theoretical propriety of a waiver—through confession judgments—of
the right to contest the merits of a contractual dispute, and supports
the Fuentes implication that circumstances may prove the waiver
involuntary and therefore constitutionally deficient. Because the
facts in Overmyer did not disclose such circumstances, the Court did
not explain the nature of the legal procedures for testing the validity
of a particular confession judgment—such as a prior hearing on the
voluntariness of waiver—but merely indicated that some "legal con-
sequences" would ensue. It is the nature of such consequences which
constitutes the remaining major question in assessing the constitu-
tional validity of confession judgments. This question was reached
but not resolved in the case of Swarb v. Lennox. 36
Swarb involved a class action on behalf of all Pennsylvania
residents who had signed contracts authorizing confessions of
3 ° Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 198 (1972), citing D. Caplovitz, Consumers in
Trouble (1968).
1 ' 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
32
 Id. at 180. The cognovit clause was negotiated after two defaults by Overmyer on the
equipment contract. Id.
33
 Id. at 186-87. The Court used the strict criminal standard for waiver tentatively, id. at
185-86, but it has yet to be challenged. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972).
34 405 U.S. at 188.
15 See 407 U.S. at 95.
36 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
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judgment, 37 and challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's
confession of judgment procedures: 38 Relying on a study39 which
revealed that persons with incomes over $10,000 accounted for only
four percent of the debtors, the three-judge federal district court
held that the action could not be maintained as a class action on
behalf of individuals with incomes over $10,000. But relying on
testimony by the debtors that they were unaware of the meaning of
the cognivit provision, 40 the district court found that as to the
claimants with incomes less than $10,000 there was no intentional
waiver of known rights. The procedure, therefore, violated due
process of law, presumably for its failure to provide an opportunity
for a hearing on the voluntariness of the waiver. 4 '
The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court, claiming
that the district court had erred in confining relief to only certain
members of their class and asserting that the Pennsylvania statutes
should have been declared unconstitutional on their face because
any waiver of due process rights is itself violative of the
Constitution. 42 Because the Court in Overmyer had explicitly re-
jected this latter argument43
 the Court refused to find the statutes
unconstitutional per se. In affirming the district court's decision, the
Court did not reach the issue of whether the relief imposed by the
district court—a prior hearing on the voluntariness of the waiver
—should be extended to debtors with incomes over $10,000. 44 Nor
did the Court assess the constitutional propriety of such relief for
debtors making less than $10,000, stating as its reason the fact that
defendants had taken no cross appeal. 45
37
 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (E,D. Pa. 1970), afrd, 405 U.S, 191 (1972).
The Pennsylvania procedure permitted a debtor to sign 'an agreement containing a
clause authorizing the prothonotary, court clerk or any attorney to appear in any court, at any
time, to confess judgment against the debtor for any unpaid portion of the debt along with
various fees and charges. 314 F. Supp. at 1094.
34 Id. at 1097. D. Caplovitz, Consumers in Trouble (1968) is a survey of debtors in
default in Philadelphia and other cities, taken from samplings of the execution books at the
sheriff's office in Philadelphia County. Of 245 debtors, the majority had semi-skilled or
unskilled occupations. Fifty-six percent had incomes of less than $6,000, 18 percent of less
than $3,000. Four percent had incomes between $8,000 and $10,000. Thirty percent had
graduated from high school, and of 236 debtors who were aware of signing a contract, only 14
percent knew that the contract contained a confession of judgment clause. See Note, Swarb v.
Lennox: The Viability of Repeated Judicial Attacks on Confession Judgments in Pennsyl-
vania, 34 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 103 (1972); Note, Confession of Judgment in Pennsylvania, 75
Dick, L. Rev. 169 (1970).
4° 314 F. Supp, at 1099.
41
 Id. at 1100. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 93 & n,51
(1972).
47
 405 U.S. at 200.
43
 405 U.S. at 185. The case cited by the Court for the proposition that any right may be
waived, National Equip. Rental v. Szukent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), was a 5-4 decision with a
strenuous dissent on the waiver issue by Justice Black. See also Brief for Appellant at 27,
Brief of California Rural Legal Assistance as Amici Curiae at 9, Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S.
191 (1972).
44
	 U.S. at 202.
43
 Id. at 201, Justice Douglas dissented in part, arguing that since briefs were filed by
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The effect of this formal affirmance is to sanction the require-
ment of a hearing on the voluntariness of waiver, at least for debtors
with incomes less than $10,000. This requirement seems consistent
with the Court's reasoning in Fuentes and Overmyer, and • with the
Court's gratuitous comment in Swarb that such factors as contracts
of adhesion, disparity of bargaining power, and the absence of
consideration for the cognovit clause have "possible pertinency for
the participants in the Pennsylvania system." 46 For confession
debtors with incomes over $10,000, however, due process is appar-
ently satisfied by the hearing required if the defendant brings an
action to open the judgment. 47 And the Court's decision also leaves
unspecified the nature and form of those hearings which are re-
quired to determine the validity of the waiver.
Given the logical conjunction of Fuentes, Overmyer arid Swarb,
the court in Virgin Islands took the next step by requiring an
evidentiary hearing in all cases, regardless of the debtor's income or
position, to determine whether the waiver of the due process rights
to notice and hearing on the merits of a contract claim is voluntary
before a confession judgment may be entered." Though Virgin
Islands, like Overmyer, involved sophisticated businessmen who
had knowingly agreed to cognovit procedures, the district court
declined merely to enter a judgment limited to the facts at issue. 49
The court noted that to do so "would create an unwelcome prece-
dent for more marginal cases,"" and on its own motion raised the
question whether confession judgment procedures generally comport
with due process requirements. 51
Despite its demonstrated concern for low income cognovit
debtors, 52 the district court imposed a condition upon the operation
of the required hearing which could mitigate its effectiveness as a
consumer protection device. While other confession judgment
cases53 requiring a hearing on the waiver issue, including one in the
same circuit, 54 imposed the burden of proving the voluntariness of
waiver on the creditor, the Virgin Islands court reasoned that a
debtor's signature on a waiver document was sufficient prima facie
evidence of waiver to place the burden of proof on the debtor, 55
amici explicating the arguments against right to a hearing, and since oral argument was heard
on all the issues, the Court should have reached the merits. Id. at 203.
46 Id. at 201.
314 F. Supp. at 1094-95.
48 358 F. Supp. at 1206.
49 Id. at 1207.
s° Id.
51 See text at note 6 supra.
52 358 F. Supp. at 1207.
53 Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Osmond v. Spence, 327 F.
Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated in light of Swarb, 405 U.S. 971, reconsidered on remand,
359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972). See also Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa.
1970); LaPrease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.V. 1970).
54 Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
55 358 F. Supp. at 1207.
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comparing the assertion of involuntary waiver to any affirmative
defense presumed untrue unless demonstrated. 56 But any analogy to
affirmative defenses would appear to be defeated by the longstand-
ing judicial presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights,
which accords such rights fundamental status and therefore requires
proof of their voluntary surrender."
From an evidentiary perspective, the burden of proof would be
more properly placed on the creditor-claimant. The essence of a
valid waiver is that it be knowing, intelligent and voluntary." To
consider the mere signature of a consumer on a form contract to
constitute sufficient evidence of a voluntary waiver is to ignore
apparent commercial reality. 59 As a general evidentiary proposition,
the burden of proof is placed upon the proponent of a claim. 6° In
most creditor-debtor situations, since it is usually the creditor who
brings the action, the burdens of proof are his. Shifting of the
burden of proof on evidentiary grounds is generally the result of
policies requiring the parties to produce evidence to which they have
easy access, or which may be presented at less cost to one party than
another. 6 ' In cognovit proceedings, the cost of proving a claim
arguably bears more heavily on a debtor than a creditor. But, in
addition, the debtor would be required to prove a negative—that he
did not waive his rights—which is arguably more difficult than
proving an affirmative proposition., In Swarb, one of the attacks on
the confession judgment procedure accepted by the district court
was that the postjudgment hearings provided by Pennsylvania law
placed an extraordinary burden of proof on the debtor, 62 and the
Supreme Court on occasion has held that action which results in a
shift in the burden of proof itself may constitute a violation of due
56 Id. Sec generally J. Maguire, J, Weinstein, J. Chadbourn & J. Mansfield, Cases and
Materials on Evidence 1008-10 (6th ed. 1973) thereinafter cited as J. Maguire].
57 See, e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)
("We do not presume acquiesence in the loss of ,fundamental rights."); Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) ("IC]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver."). See also Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1964); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942).
55 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938),
" White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis.
L. Rev. 503, 509.
6° J. Maguire, supra note 56, at 1008-10.
'' Id, at 1020-21.
62 314 F. Stipp. at 1094. The Court noted:
The most striking feature of this latter petition (to open judgment) is that the burden
of proof is placed upon the debtor . . . who must convince the court of the need for
equitable relief. The placement of this burden upon the debtor is in direct contrast to
burdens in a normal prejudgment creditor-debtor action.
Id. See also D. H. Overmyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 190 & n.* (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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process.° It seems anomalous, given the court's propensity to pro-
tect "marginal cases" and low income consumers, to conceive a plan
to vindicate due process rights which at the same time makes it very
difficult to establish that such rights have been violated." Another
problem, perhaps more immediately significant, is the difficulty the
burden of proof allocation creates for future attacks on confession
judgments in other jurisdictions mounted to obtain judicial con-
sumer protection in the form of hearings on the waiver issue. 65 The
scheme cannot be cited as one which protects consumers if its weight
of proof makes its protection illusory.
Apart from its placement of the burden of proof, the Virgin
Islands requirement of a hearing on the voluntariness of waiver
appears to represent the procedure most likely to be adopted in cases
in which confession judgments are challenged. The Swarb Court
adopted a limited version, available to persons with incomes of less
than $10,000. A Delaware district court adopted it in full, in Os-
mond v. Spence, 66 imposing the burden of proof on the creditor. A
district court in Illinois adopted it in cases in which garnishments
are invoked to satisfy confession judgments also imposing the bur-
den of proof on the creditor, 67 and the debtors in the most recent
attack on confession judgments—Tunheim v. Bawman 68—are seek-
ing similar relief.
The major deficiency of a hearing procedure is its cost, in time
and money. It places increasing burdens on already congested
courts, and results in increased expenses to.the creditor and debtor.
The Virgin Islands court meets the former objection by observing
that in practice few hearings will take place in cases involving
corporate defendants, who could rarely argue plausibly that their
corporate counsel waived unknowingly. 69 In marginal cases in
which contracting parties are individuals and small businessmen
acting on advice of counsel, the issue might be resolved on the basis
of affidavits alone." Cases in which a full hearing would be neces-
sary would be limited to those involving low income consumers
' See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U,S. 545 (1965); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958); Western & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).6°
	 court suggested that the burden of proving voluntariness of waiver will not be
difficult for debtors since merely by alleging a lack of understanding, they will satisfy the
burden. The court also suggested that creditors protect themselves from such assertions by
placing the waiver in bold face type, and in a place so conspicuous that no defendant could
claim ignorance of it. 358 F. Supp. 1207 (1973). But see White, supra note 59, at 509-10 n.25,
where it is suggested that since few people read what they sign, even a conspicuous notice of
waiver might be inadequate.
65
 Letter from Thomas Leen, Clark County Nevada Legal Services Program, to Donald
Foster, National Consumer Law Center, Sept. 20, 1973.
66
 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated in light of Swarb, 405 U.S. 971, recon-
sidered on remand, 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972).
67 Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N. D. Ill. 1972).
68 Civil No. LV2000 (D. Nev., filed March 13, 1973).
" 358 F. Supp. at 1206-07.
7° Id.
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signing form contracts for installment payments or small loans
—precisely the debtors a hearing is designed to protect.
Even if the court's reasoning is correct, however, it might be
argued that the limited number of hearings actually needed would
significantly burden the judicial system. However, the alternatives
to a hearing, which would seem less burdensome to the courts,
reveal defects that outweigh their savings in cost. One less costly
alternative, suggested by the Virgin Islands court's approach to the
case, is to leave determinations of the fairness of the contractual
relationship to the judge, allowing ,him to call sua sponte for what-
ever procedures are necessary to protect the parties' due process
rights." At present, however, most state statutes allow requests for
judgment under cognovit clauses to go to the clerk of the court, and
to be entered without judicial supervision. 72 Unless the Supreme
Court were to forbid such procedures as violations of due process, 73
which it evidenced no predilection to do in either Swarb or Over-
myer, this sua sponte alternative would be available only in federal
courts and in those states whose rules of procedure are similar to the
Federal Rules. 74
 Furthermore, since the adversary nature of confes-
sion judgments is minimal, it might not be clear from the request for
judgment whether or not a waiver was voluntarily signed, requiring
a hearing to assess the facts. Of course, the judge would be empow-
ered to call a hearing in such cases, but the number of hearings so
initiated would arguably be no fewer than those initiated by debtors
who under appropriate state statutes may move to vacate the judg-
ment. Thus, the cost to the judicial system would be no less.
Finally, it may be argued that a procedure is either required for due
process or it is not. To allow judicial discretion in deciding whether
or not a specific procedure is called for in a given circumstance may
undermine the objective of the due process requirement—to pre-
vent arbitrary, capricious and unfair deprivations of liberty or
property."
A second alternative involving fewer burdens on judicial re-
sources than the availability of a hearing as a matter of right is to
require cognovit debtors themselves to initiate attacks on cognovit
clauses on constitutional or contract grounds such as unconscion-
ability. Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows a
court to find a contract, or any part of it, unconscionable as a matter
of law after a consideration of evidence defining the commercial
71 Sec text at note 6 supra.
72 See notes 4 and 5 supra,
73
 See, e.g., Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969), in which the court found that sincelhe confession judgment was entered
by a court clerk whose functions were ministerial, its entry was without certain minimums of
judicial process and therefore not entitled to enforcement under the full faith 
.and credit
clause. See Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 521, 558
(1973).
" See note 5 supra.
75
 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
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setting, purpose and effect of the relevant contractual provision. In
enforcing the unconscionability, doctrine, the courts have taken into
account such factors as gross price differentials, inequality of bar-
gaining power, and duress. 76 The problem with arguments of un-
conscionability and other affirmative challenges is that they may
only be asserted at a hearing on the merits of an action, where the
contract itself is being litigated, and low income debtors often can-
not afford to bring such action. In the case of confession judgments,
the number of hearings on the merits is arguably small since the
debtor must usually petition the court to open judgment, succeed on
that motion, and then proceed to trial on the merits. In light of the
Supreme Court's refusal to find confession judgments unconstitu-
tional per se, it is unlikely that a court would find a cognovit clause
unconscionable per se, 77
 and even in those cases in which the clause
is found unconscionable, the holding would likely be based on a
recognition that the waiver was involuntary. Yet such a conclusion
involves precisely the same factual scrutiny called for in the prior
hearing required in Virgin Islands.
The second aspect of the cost problem of a required hearing is
the cost in expenses to both the creditor and the debtor. Proponents
of the use of confession judgments and other prejudgment remedies
argue that a hearing requirement will generally harm the low in-
come consumers it is designed to -protect, by forcing businesses to
abandon as costly, or no longer useful, the practice of utilizing
cognovit provisions, and to raise the price of credit as a
consequence. 78
 But it has been demonstrated that despite the di-
minishing availability of prejudgment procedures, the ease and cost
of obtaining credit has not been affected, which indicates that the
abandonment of cognovit provisions will not injure low income
consumers. 79
If the due process hearing requirement prescribed in Virgin
Islands will not result in the abolition of cognovit proceedings, the
administration of such procedures may nonetheless cost the con-
sumer more than prejudgment procedures without the added due
process requirement. It has been suggested that courts make a more
critical evaluation of these costs before imposing a due process
requirement which might hurt consumers more than help." While
the Virgin Islands court considered the cost problem in terms of time
imposed on the court, it did not consider the cost to the business
7° See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (1965); Jones v. Star
Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 289, N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
77
 See text at notes 31-35 supra.
76
 See White, supra note 59, th 511; Note, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 554 (1973).
79
 See Hoekje, Confession Judgments under Warrant of Attorney, 6 Akron L. Rev. 63
(1973); Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 111 (1961); Note, 48 Notre Dame Law. 733 (1973); Note,
Confession of Judgment in Pennsylvania, 75 Dick. L. Rev. 169 (1970).
See generally White, supra note 59, at 503.
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creditor of entry fee, service fees, lawyer's fees, of arranging for
witnesses for the hearing, of sheriff's services, and the costs of
uncollected debts. Arguably, such costs will be passed on to the
debtor in one form or another. It is not suggested that a decision
requiring due process should be based entirely on its costs; indeed,
the implication that due process should be denied because its costs
are too great is a dangerous one. But in terms of evaluating a
hearing procedure as a consumer protection device, its costs to
consumers must arguably be a factor."
If low income consumers are confronted with the prospect of
prohibitive due process costs on the one hand, and due process
deprivations on the other, it may be argued that confession judg-
ment procedures should be abolished, The Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly repudiated that conclusion," but federal and state legisla-
tures are empowered to reach such a conclusion as a matter of
policy. Both courts83 and commentators84
 have noted the inherent
constraints against reform of confession judgments under the broad
due process rubric. And legislatures appear to be particularly appro-
priate bodies to gather the facts necessary to weigh the costs against
the benefits of various cognovit procedures, an ability which appar-
ently led the Supreme Court in Swarb to call such questions "grist
for the legislative mill." 85
 As of .1970, eighteen states% and the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code 87 had forbidden the use of confes-
sion judgments entirely. Twenty-nine states" limited their use in
some way, leaving only 'three states89 which still generally au-
thorized cognovit proceedings. In the states where limitations are
imposed, the restrictions are generally in the area of retail install-
ment contracts, small loans, motor vehicle sales, home repair con-
tracts and other commercial transactions in which consumers are in
the weakest bargaining position. 90 New York, for example, allows
confession judgments in general, but makes it illegal to confess a
31 The following questions might be considered in assessing the cost of confession
judgments: (1) How effective are confession judgments in procuring payment of debt? (2)
What percentage of all secured loans does ,a creditor obtain through the use of confession
judgments? (3) To the extent that there are added costs for hearings, who will bear them? (4)
If there is a hearing imposed, will creditors use confession judgments less? (5) Among debtors
in default, how many have the defense of involuntary waiver? (6) How many defaulting
debtors would appear at the hearing? These factors were suggested by Professor White in the
context of his discussion of self-help repossession. See White, supra note 59, at 511.
37
 D.H. Overmyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See text at notes 31-35 supra.
U See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 202
(1972).
34
 See Hoekje, supra note 79, at 73; Note, Swarb v. Lennox: The Viability of Repeated
Judicial Attacks on Confession Judgments in Pennsylvania, 34 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 103, 105
(1972).
IS
 405 U.S. at 202.
33
 See Brief for Plaintiffs at 48, Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
37 Uniform Consumer Credit Code 2.415.
" See Brief for Plaintiffs at 48, Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
" See id,
9" See id. at 51.
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judgment before a default has taken place under installment con-
tracts of, under $1500. 9 ' The fact that so many states have abolished
confession judgments or restricted their use in consumer transactions
without causing significant increases in the cost of credit 92 indicates
that the commercial advantages of their use may be minimal. But
without state or federal legislative action, attacks in the courts on
existing procedures can only result in piecemeal reform. Since the
Virgin Islands decision has potential value as precedent in litigation
involving confession judgments in other federal jurisdictions, its
impact may exceed the geographic limitations of the island district in
which it was made. But until the Supreme Court resolves the extant
procedural questions 93
 involving the nature and form of hearings
concerning waiver, judicial reform will remain the product of dispar-
ate case-by-case advances. By its reluctance in Swarb to address
these questions, the Court has signaled its intention that the pros-
pects for the general reevaluation of confession judgment procedures
remain in the legislative province.
JEAN S. PERWIN
Copyright Law—Exclusivity of Constitutional Grant of Copyright
Power to Federal Government—Supremacy Clause and Federal
Preemption—Durational Limit of Copyright—Goldstein v.
California.'
—Donald Goldstein and others, manufacturers and
vendors of sound tapes and cartridges, engaged in the practice
known as "tape piracy." 2
 They made exact reproductions on master
tapes of record albums purchased on the open market from retail
distributors. 3
 Additional copies of the master tapes were made on
machines known as "tape slaves." The tapes were marketed in
plastic cartridges, labelled with the title of the original album, the
name of the artist, the name of the original record company, and a
disclaimer of any relationship with the original artist or record
com pany. 4
In 1970, Tape Industries Association of America and others,
91 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law art. 9, § 302.13 (McKinney Supp, 1973); N.Y. CPLR § 3201,
3218 (McKinney 1963).
°' See Hopson, supra note 79, at 125.
93
 The opportunity for the Court to review this question will have to come in a case other
than Virgin Islands, since there was no appeal taken, presumably because the defendant
never appeared at the hearing for lack of a defense. Letter from John L. Rogers, Clerk, to
Judge Warren H, Young, United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands,
Oct. 15, 1973.
' 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
2
 Id. at 549.
3
 The method of operation is fully explained in Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v.
Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340, 342-43 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
4
 The label read as follows:
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